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Rogers’ research considers how institutions interact in separation-of-power systems with a focus on the role of courts in those systems. As such, it examines how courts and other institutions mutually construct their decision-making environment and the reciprocal influence that the institutions have on each other. Other aspects of this focus include studies of bicameral interaction in state legislatures and implications of judicial review for state economic policies.
James R. Rogers is editor of the Journal of Theoretical Politics, and is currently working on a book, States & Nation: Rightly Dividing Political Authority.
Dr. Rogers teaches graduate courses in political institutions and public administration, as well as in game theory and mathematical modeling. He teaches undergraduate courses in constitutional law, comparative state constitutions, law and legislation, and research methods.
- POLS 355 – United States Constitutional Development
He has published a number of articles and published a book. His articles include “Resurrecting Lochner: A Defense of Unprincipled Judicial Activism” (Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2007, with George Vanberg), “The Impact of Divided Government on Legislative Production” (Public Choice, 2005), “Empirical Determinants of Bicameral Sequence in State Legislatures,” (Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2005), “National Judicial Power and the Dormant Commerce Clause” with C. Carrubba, (Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2003), “Judicial Advisory Opinions and Legislative Outcomes” (American Journal of Political Science, 2002, with G. Vanberg) and “Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Judicial-Legislative Interaction,” (American Journal of Political Science, 2001). Additional articles have been published in American Journal of Political Science 1998, 1999, Legislative Studies Quarterly 2003, 2005, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2001, Public Choice, 2002, 2005, The Tax Lawyer, 2000, and Creighton Law Review 1999. The book, Institutional Games and the Supreme Court (with Jon Bond and Roy Flemming) was published in 2006. Rogers contributed three chapters to the book.
Session 1 Larson Market Revolution in America
Session 1 Marx The German Ideology
Session 1 Polyani The Great Transformation
Session 2 Hejeebu & McCloskey The reproving of Karl Polanyi Critical Review
Session 2 Henaff The Price of Truth
Session 3 Marx Economic and Philisophic Manuscripts of 1844
Session 3 Ropke A Humane Economy 90-137
Session 3 Ropke A Humane Economy 137-150
Session 4 Barclay Paul and the Gift
Session 4 Rogers Its Convenience Not Ontology
Session 5 Ropke A Humane Economy 222-261