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Associate Department Head
- International Relations
- International Security
- International Conflict
- Nuclear Proliferation
Matthew Fuhrmann is Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University. His previous positions include Visiting Associate Professor at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (2016-17), Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (2010-11), and Pre-Doctoral Research Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (2007-08). He was named an Andrew Carnegie Fellow in 2016 by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. His research focuses on international relations, nuclear proliferation, and armed conflict. He is the author of Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity (Cornell University Press, 2012) and the coauthor of Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge University Press, 2017). His work has been published in peer reviewed journals such as American Journal of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, and Journal of Politics. He has also written opinion pieces for The Atlantic (online), The Christian Science Monitor, Slate, and USA Today. He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. You can follow him on Twitter @mcfuhrmann.
- POLS 306: Contemporary Political Problems and Issues
- POLS 418: Theories of International Relations
- POLS 631: Conflict Studies
Matthew Fuhrmann. 2012. Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (Studies in Security Affairs).
Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2013. “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail,” International Organization, 67 (1): 173-195.
Matthew Fuhrmann. 2009. “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” International Security 34 (1): 7-41.